Jeremy Corbyn faces concerted opposition from the right-wing PLP, but there are three issues he could have dealt with differently to strengthen the left: Trident, Scotland and the Greens.
We are in the strange position today where the leader of the Labour Party is a socialist, yet all but a handful of the Parliamentary Labour Party stand well to his right and differ among themselves only in how to contain or get rid of him. Stranger still is that since the New Labour era in the Party determining policy is de facto in the hands of the Leader alone. Yet in practice the PLP constrains Jeremy by the never uttered, but very real, threat of mass defection to form a new Party, which would return Corbyn to the back benches and split Labour in the country. So where could Jeremy have taken decisive action at the top to strengthen his hand, win allies and neutralise the right?
Calling for a referendum on the renewal of Trident. Jeremy is right: Trident is immoral and useless for any realistic defence purpose. It serves today only as a national status symbol of prowess, and as a huge subsidy to the US arms industry. The Labour Right, who dominate the PLP and shadow cabinet are wedded to the Britain-as-superpower narrative. Labour says it will have a review, but Jeremy says he would never push the button. Irrespective of whether you are for or against nuclear weapons, the current position is ridiculous. But there is a way out the mire which would help the left: call for a referendum on the issue. A referendum could be initiated either by the current Tory government (unlikely) or by a future Labour-led government. Letting the people speak would shut up the the Labour Right. The issue would be: should we spend the billions on bombs or the health service? Let the people decide whether during a Labour-led government there should be nuclear weapons which Corbyn won’t use - or whether the people want the money freed up for health and education.
Let Scotland do its own thing. The momentum is towards independence, and why should socialists worry about that and get into unnecessary conflict with a currently centre-left leaning SNP? Scottish Labour today, led by the Labour Right, has been reduced to a single Scottish Labour MP, partly because the Scottish Party was treated as a branch office of UK Labour. The solution is simple: bestow independence on the Scottish Labour Party and let them do whatever they want, but hoping of course for a left turn. The next Labour government - supposing there is one and Scottish independence has not been achieved by then - would be a coalition between the the Scottish Labour Party, the Labour Party of England and Wales, hopefully the Greens, and even possibly the SNP and Plaid.
Work with the Greens. If in the 2020 General Election Corbyn were short of a majority by say five seats and the Greens had say ten, would anyone be against a Corbyn-Green coalition? Of course not. In fact, most would positively welcome it. So if a coalition is OK in government, then why not in opposition? One step Jeremy could have taken was to call for a coalition in Parliament and in the country with the Greens and, if she were willing, appoint Caroline Lucas to the environmental portfolio in the Shadow Cabinet. Outside Parliament Corbyn and the Greens have a common interest in working together for a government which would end austerity, get rid of Trident, and protect the environment within which we all live.
Jeremy Corbyn’s problem is not that he is too left-wing, but that he is trapped into a Labour tribalist Westminster mindset. He should be bolder.
25 October 2015
22 October 2015
Jeremy Corbyn needs the mandatory re-selection of Labour MPs
Jeremy Corbyn needs socialists in the next Parliament, so right-wing Labour MPs need to be booted out by their Constituency Labour Parties.
In the middle of October, Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, more or less told the Parliamentary Labour Party that he opposed any move by the party membership to replace Blairite MPs with socialists. He thinks by doing this he can stabilise the party and win support for his leadership. He is wrong: the Labour right will never support him.
The time for the left to act in the party is now. Already Corbyn is being pushed to the right by the PLP. In little more than a year, the call for unity in time for the next election will go up; and the left will be framed as wreckers, if they haven’t re-oriented the Party by then.
The next Parliament needs a contingent of socialist Labour MPs - if not there is no chance of a genuine progressive government. That’s why the left should seize its opportunity now, and Corbyn is foolish to side with the PLP against his own supporters.
In the middle of October, Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, more or less told the Parliamentary Labour Party that he opposed any move by the party membership to replace Blairite MPs with socialists. He thinks by doing this he can stabilise the party and win support for his leadership. He is wrong: the Labour right will never support him.
The time for the left to act in the party is now. Already Corbyn is being pushed to the right by the PLP. In little more than a year, the call for unity in time for the next election will go up; and the left will be framed as wreckers, if they haven’t re-oriented the Party by then.
The next Parliament needs a contingent of socialist Labour MPs - if not there is no chance of a genuine progressive government. That’s why the left should seize its opportunity now, and Corbyn is foolish to side with the PLP against his own supporters.
3 October 2015
Surviving under ubiquitous surveillance
To protect their psychological health and to be free citizens, people need to encrypt their electronic communication.
“Once we know there’s a reasonable chance that we are being watched in one fashion or another it’s hard for that not to have a ‘panopticon effect' where we think and behave differently based on the assumption that people may be watching and paying attention to what we are doing.”
The mass of electronic surveillance details revealed by the CIA analyst and private contractor Edward Snowden in 2013 establish one indubitable fact: the NSA in the US, and GCHQ in Britain, want access to all diplomatic, commercial and private electronic data from their own countries and from the rest of the world. To that end, they have built facilities that hoover up electronic data in transit; they have hacked into telephone networks and in some cases have planted spyware into computers. If the correspondence of the average citizen - the recipes, shopping lists and notes to granny - are not sorted and stored, it is only because the spooks have decided not to retain it. Yet the mere fact that what one expects to be private is not private at all has deep psychological implications for the average citizen. We browse the net for private information and stimulation, and we communicate electronically for a myriad of purposes: writing love letters, talking honestly with friends about our workplaces, neighbours and teachers. Our surveilled data, even if of no interest to the spooks, lies copied on several servers with the danger of it falling victim to malicious hacking multiplied.
However, for people who are, were, or might wish in the future to be active politically, the damage is more immediately felt. If we take the now established fact that British police have over the last few decades embedded over 1200 long term double-life spies in civic organisations at a cost of millions of pounds each year, it would be absurd to assume that the much cheaper practice of collecting, sorting and storing the electronic communication of those who engage in politics is not endemic.
The law governing surveillance offers little protection. The fact is that by one means or another our data can become available to the institutions of the state. Only when the state needs to make public that it has our data (e.g. for a prosecution) does the issue of the legality of the state possessing it in the first place arise. It is thus reasonable to believe that the annual two and half million requests by police to access our data legally is only the tip of the iceberg - or the icing on the cake - of surveillance.
And who is targeted, legally or otherwise? Today, it is reasonable to think that at the very least the members of the Green Party and now Jeremy Corbyn and his supporters in the Labour Party, as well as host of other campaigning groups, are under active surveillance - along with all those who campaigned for Scottish independence. Indeed, there are documented cases of police surveillance of people in these legal and democratic organisations.
Yet citizens do not stand completely naked before the state. And if one wants privacy, be it a matter of principle, for psychological health, or to campaign for political goals with as little state surveillance and impediment as possible, then people need to encrypt their data and communication. David Cameron has gone on record saying he wants to outlaw encryption for which the state does not have a backdoor, but without the help of the US, that is a non-starter.
When Alice sends an email to Bob the email travels through cables and is then stored in servers at Google, Yahoo or wherever. Scanning it at any point takes a microsecond, so the content is simply there for the taking. And until recently that was all the spooks had to do, but with the rise of https (the green text and the padlock icon), used by Google, Facebook and others, the content is encrypted between the user's browser and the service provider. But we can’t be sure that the spooks don’t have a backdoor to the encryption, that the service provider doesn’t hand over content, maybe unwillingly, or that the storage facilities have not been hacked or corrupted in some way.
But if Alice encrypts her email before it even leaves her computer with open-source algorithms and keys which are under the control of her and the recipient, the spooks are stymied. Hence Cameron’s concern. What is intercepted or stored on the service provider’s server is indecipherable. Alice and Bob can do this by using encryption software on their computers, such as PGP - or they can use web-based end-to-end encryption services, such as ProtonMail or Tutanota - or, of course, both in conjunction.
All that leaves the spooks with only one option: to hack your computer. Unless you take several complicated precautions they can probably do this, but they must want to target you personally as an important person because they will need to devote time an effort to the job. In other words the cost to the spooks of surveillance increases exponentially and the number of people (if they use encryption) that they can monitor falls dramatically. And even then their surveillance is not fully effective because you might be using several devices. So unless the state is really after you, the encryption of your communication and stored data is probably enough to maintain your privacy.
So fight for your privacy and encrypt.
“Once we know there’s a reasonable chance that we are being watched in one fashion or another it’s hard for that not to have a ‘panopticon effect' where we think and behave differently based on the assumption that people may be watching and paying attention to what we are doing.”
The mass of electronic surveillance details revealed by the CIA analyst and private contractor Edward Snowden in 2013 establish one indubitable fact: the NSA in the US, and GCHQ in Britain, want access to all diplomatic, commercial and private electronic data from their own countries and from the rest of the world. To that end, they have built facilities that hoover up electronic data in transit; they have hacked into telephone networks and in some cases have planted spyware into computers. If the correspondence of the average citizen - the recipes, shopping lists and notes to granny - are not sorted and stored, it is only because the spooks have decided not to retain it. Yet the mere fact that what one expects to be private is not private at all has deep psychological implications for the average citizen. We browse the net for private information and stimulation, and we communicate electronically for a myriad of purposes: writing love letters, talking honestly with friends about our workplaces, neighbours and teachers. Our surveilled data, even if of no interest to the spooks, lies copied on several servers with the danger of it falling victim to malicious hacking multiplied.
However, for people who are, were, or might wish in the future to be active politically, the damage is more immediately felt. If we take the now established fact that British police have over the last few decades embedded over 1200 long term double-life spies in civic organisations at a cost of millions of pounds each year, it would be absurd to assume that the much cheaper practice of collecting, sorting and storing the electronic communication of those who engage in politics is not endemic.
The law governing surveillance offers little protection. The fact is that by one means or another our data can become available to the institutions of the state. Only when the state needs to make public that it has our data (e.g. for a prosecution) does the issue of the legality of the state possessing it in the first place arise. It is thus reasonable to believe that the annual two and half million requests by police to access our data legally is only the tip of the iceberg - or the icing on the cake - of surveillance.
And who is targeted, legally or otherwise? Today, it is reasonable to think that at the very least the members of the Green Party and now Jeremy Corbyn and his supporters in the Labour Party, as well as host of other campaigning groups, are under active surveillance - along with all those who campaigned for Scottish independence. Indeed, there are documented cases of police surveillance of people in these legal and democratic organisations.
Yet citizens do not stand completely naked before the state. And if one wants privacy, be it a matter of principle, for psychological health, or to campaign for political goals with as little state surveillance and impediment as possible, then people need to encrypt their data and communication. David Cameron has gone on record saying he wants to outlaw encryption for which the state does not have a backdoor, but without the help of the US, that is a non-starter.
When Alice sends an email to Bob the email travels through cables and is then stored in servers at Google, Yahoo or wherever. Scanning it at any point takes a microsecond, so the content is simply there for the taking. And until recently that was all the spooks had to do, but with the rise of https (the green text and the padlock icon), used by Google, Facebook and others, the content is encrypted between the user's browser and the service provider. But we can’t be sure that the spooks don’t have a backdoor to the encryption, that the service provider doesn’t hand over content, maybe unwillingly, or that the storage facilities have not been hacked or corrupted in some way.
But if Alice encrypts her email before it even leaves her computer with open-source algorithms and keys which are under the control of her and the recipient, the spooks are stymied. Hence Cameron’s concern. What is intercepted or stored on the service provider’s server is indecipherable. Alice and Bob can do this by using encryption software on their computers, such as PGP - or they can use web-based end-to-end encryption services, such as ProtonMail or Tutanota - or, of course, both in conjunction.
All that leaves the spooks with only one option: to hack your computer. Unless you take several complicated precautions they can probably do this, but they must want to target you personally as an important person because they will need to devote time an effort to the job. In other words the cost to the spooks of surveillance increases exponentially and the number of people (if they use encryption) that they can monitor falls dramatically. And even then their surveillance is not fully effective because you might be using several devices. So unless the state is really after you, the encryption of your communication and stored data is probably enough to maintain your privacy.
So fight for your privacy and encrypt.
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